§ 53a-5

When the commission of an offense defined in this title, or some element of an offense, requires a particular mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms 'intentionally', 'knowingly', 'recklessly' or 'criminal negligence', or by use of terms, such as 'with intent to defraud' and 'knowing it to be false', describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.(1969, P.A. 828, S. 5.)Cited. 173 C. 35; 186 C. 45; 201 C. 505; 202 C. 520; 209 C. 75; 235 C. 477; 242 C. 211. When a statute requires state to prove that defendant intentionally engaged in the statutorily proscribed conduct, section does not require court to presume that the statute requires state to prove that defendant had knowledge of a circumstance described in the statute. 265 C. 35.Cited. 9 CA 161; Id., 686; 17 CA 339; 19 CA 609; 40 CA 643.